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Abstract
A strong correlated equilibrium is a correlated strategy proﬁle that is immune to
joint deviations. Existing solution concepts assume that players receive simultane-
ously correlated recommendations from the mediator. An ex-ante strong correlated
equilibrium (Moreno D., Wooders J., 1996. Games Econ. Behav. 17, 80-113) is im-
mune to deviations that are planned before receiving the recommendations. In this
note we focus on mediation protocols where players may get their recommendations
at several stages, and show that an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is immune
to deviations at all stages of the protocol.
Key words: coalition-proofness, strong correlated equilibrium, common knowledge,
incomplete information, non-cooperative games. JEL classiﬁcation: C72, D82.
1 Introduction
In the mid-90s, a series of papers considered the following question for normal-form
games: what happens when players are allowed to correlate their strategies (using a
correlation device or a mediator) but some players may jointly deviate from poten-
tial correlated outcomes? Quite a few solution concepts with similar names emerged:
strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibrium (Einy and Peleg, 1995; Milgrom and
Roberts, 1996; Moreno and Wooders, 1996; Ray 1996, 1998). The diﬀerent concepts
can be characterized (see Ray, 1996) according to three main parameters: (1) When
players are allowed to discuss deviations: before correlation (ex-ante equilibrium) or
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after correlation (ex-post equilibrium)? (2) Can deviators transmit private informa-
tion truthfully and construct new correlation devices? (3) Does the equilibrium have
to be immune to all joint deviations (strong equilibrium, as in Aumann, 1959) or only
to self-enforcing deviations (coalition-proof equilibrium, as in Bernheim et al., 1987).
Recently, Bloch and Dutta (2009) revived this research agenda and discussed the issue
of transmission of information in an admissible way.
All the concepts mentioned above assume that players receive simultaneously cor-
related recommendations from the mediator. A natural question that arises is what
happens if the recommendations are not received simultaneously: players may receive
the recommendations sequentially (see, e.g., Heller, 2009), possibly at a random order,
or each recommendation may be transmitted in several pieces. What are the proper
solution concepts in this case, and what are the relationships between these concepts?
The contribution of this note is twofold. First, we introduce a new solution concept that
captures joint deviations at diﬀerent stages of the recommendation transmission pro-
tocol, and formally model it by an incomplete information model a` la Aumann (1987).
We deﬁne an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium as a correlated strategy proﬁle that
is immune to all joint deviations at all stages. 2 Second, we show that this new no-
tion coincides with Moreno and Wooders (1996)'s notion of ex-ante strong correlated
equilibrium (which is immune to deviations only before recieving the recomendations).
This implies that this ex-ante notion is much more robust than originally presented,
and that this set of ex-ante equilibria is included in all other sets of strong correlated
equilibria (see Figure 1 in Section 3).
Holmstrom and Myerson (1983, Sections 4-5)'s classical result, adapted to our frame-
work, shows that resistance to deviations of the grand coalition at the ex-ante stage
implies resistance to such deviations at the ex-post stage. Our result extends it in two
ways: proving the resistance at all stages (not only at the ex-post stage), and against
deviations of all coalitions.
The note is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents the
result and the proof. In Section 4 we demonstrate the intuition behind the result.
2 Model and Deﬁnitions
A game in strategic form is a tuple: G =
(
N, (Ai)i∈N , (u
i)i∈N
)
, where N is the ﬁnite
and non-empty set of players. For each i ∈ N , Ai is player i 's ﬁnite and non-empty set
of actions, and ui is player i 's payoﬀ function, a real-valued function on A =
∏
i∈N Ai.
Given a coalition S ⊆ N , let AS = ∏i∈S Ai, and let −S = {i ∈ N | i /∈ S} denote the
complementary coalition.
It is convenient to use Aumann (1987)'s model of incomplete information in modeling a
mediation protocol. A state space is a ﬁnite probability space (Ω,P). Each state ω ∈ Ω
describes all parameters that may be the object of uncertainty on the part of the
2 Deviators are allowed to transmit private information and construct correlation devices.
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players: signals that are received from the mediator, messages that deviating players
can send each other, and realizations of random devices that can be used to correlate
joint deviations. The distribution P is the common prior belief over Ω. Finiteness of Ω
is assumed to simplify presentation, but it plays no role in the result.
We now ﬁx a game G and a state space (Ω,P). Given coalition S, a correlated strategy
S-tuple is a function fS = (f i)i∈S from Ω into A
S, and an S-information structure
(F i)i∈S is an S-tuple of partitions of Ω. We interpret F i as the information partition
of player i at some stage of the mediation protocol; that is, if the true state is ω ∈ Ω
then player i is informed of that element F i(ω) of F i that contains ω.
A mediation protocol is modeled as follows. The correlated strategy N -tuple f = fN
describes the vector of recommended actions. At the beginning of the mediation pro-
tocol (the ex-ante stage), the players are completely ignorant: their N -information
structure is the coarsest one (∀i ∈ N, F i = {Ω}). As the protocol goes on, the players
receive signals from the mediator, and the information partition of each player i ∈ N
becomes ﬁner. At the end of the protocol (the ex-post stage), each player i knows his
recommended action: each f i is measurable with respect to F i.
A joint deviation of coalition S is a pair
(
GS,gS
)
, where GS denotes the information
the deviators have at the stage of the mediation protocol in which they agree to
deviate, and gS denotes the actions that S members will play in G. Speciﬁcally, each
Gi describes the information that player i ∈ S deduced from: the signals he received
from the mediator so far; the messages he received from the other deviators; and the
unanimous agreement of S members to deviate. Like the existing notions of strong
correlated equilibrium (and in contrast with the coalition-proof notions), we assume
that joint deviations are binding (a` la Moulin and Vial, 1978): when the members of
S unanimously agree to deviate, they are bound to follow the deviation even if new
information received at a later stage makes it unproﬁtable.
The deviation is played with the assistance of a new mediator. Each deviator sends
the new mediator all the signals he has received during the original mediation protocol
(both before and after the unianimous agreement to deviate). After the new mediator
receives the recommended actions of all the deviators, fS, it sends each deviator i ∈ S
a new recommended action gi. We assume that the deviators (and the new mediator)
have no information about the actions recommended to the non-deviating players,
except the conditional probability given the information they have on their own rec-
ommended actions. That is, we assume that
(
GS,gS
)
is conditionally independent of
f−S given fS. Formally:
Deﬁnition 1 A joint deviation of coalition S from a correlated strategy N -tuple f is
a pair
(
GS,gS
)
, where GS is an S-information structure, gS is a correlated strategy S-
tuple, and both are conditionally independent of f−S, given fS. That is: ∀ω ∈ Ω, ES =
(Ei)i∈S ⊆ ΩS, bS ∈ AS, a ∈ A, P
(
GS (ω) = ES, gS = bS, f−S = a−S|fS = aS
)
= P
(
GS (ω) = ES, gS = bS|fS = aS
)
· P
(
f−S = a−S|fS = aS
)
.(
GS,gS
)
is an ex-ante joint deviation if GS is coarsest: ∀i ∈ S, Gi = {Ω}; it is an
ex-post joint deviation if ∀i ∈ S, f i is measurable with respect to Gi.
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A player i ∈ S will agree to be a part of a joint deviation, only if his expected payoﬀ
when deviating, conditional on his information and on the unanimous agreement of all
members of S to deviate, is larger than when playing the original correlated strategy
N -tuple. His agreement to participate in the joint deviation is a public signal to all
the deviators about that fact. This implies that if the players in S unanimously decide
to deviate at some state ω ∈ Ω, then it is common knowledge among them (at ω) that
each player believes that he will proﬁt by this deviation (as demonstrated in Section
4). In that case we say that the deviation is proﬁtable. Formally:
Deﬁnition 2 (Aumann 1976) Let S be a coalition, (Gi)i∈S an S-information structure,
and ω ∈ Ω a state. An event E ∈ B is common knowledge among the members of S
at ω if E includes that member of Gmeet = ∧
i∈S
Gi that contains ω.
Deﬁnition 3 Let f be a correlated strategy proﬁle, and S a coalition. A joint deviation(
GS,gS
)
is a proﬁtable joint deviation from f , if there exists ω ∈ Ω such that it is
common knowledge among the members of S at ω that ∀i ∈ S, E (ui (f) |Gi (ω)) <
E
(
ui
(
gS, f−S
)
|Gi (ω)
)
. 3
We end this section by deﬁning an all-stage (resp., ex-ante, ex-post) strong correlated
equilibrium as an N -tuple that is immune to joint deviations at all stages (resp., ex-
ante stage, ex-post stage).
Deﬁnition 4 A correlated strategy N -tuple f is an all-stage (resp., ex-ante, ex-post)
strong correlated equilibrium if no coalition has a (resp., ex-ante, ex-post) proﬁtable
joint deviation from f .
One can verify the following facts: (1) An all-stage strong correlated equilibrium is also
a strong correlated equilibrium according to all the deﬁnitions in the existing literature
(referred to below). (2)
(
GS,gS
)
is a proﬁtable ex-ante joint deviation from f if and
only if ∀i ∈ S, E (ui (f)) < E
(
ui
(
gS, f−S
))
. (3) Our deﬁnition of ex-ante strong
correlated equilibrium is equivalent to Moreno and Wooders (1996)'s deﬁnition, and
it is more restrictive than all other existing ex-ante deﬁnitions. 4 (4) Our deﬁnition
of ex-post strong correlated equilibrium is also an ex-post equilibrium according to all
other existing ex-post deﬁnitions. 5
3 Result
We now show that the ex-ante notion and the all-stage notion coincide.
3
(
gS , f−S
)
denotes the N -tuple where its i-th component is gi if i ∈ S and f i if i ∈ −S.
4 Other ex-ante deﬁnitions in the literature impose restrictions on deviating coalitions: in
Ray (1996) coalitions cannot construct new correlation devices; in Milgrom and Roberts
(1996) only some of the coalitions can coordinate deviations.
5 Other existing ex-post deﬁnitions impose restrictions on deviating coalitions: Einy and Pe-
leg (1995) require deviations to be strictly proﬁtable at all states; Ray (1998) allow coalitions
to use only pure deviations; Bloch and Dutta (2008) restrict the information structure to
represent only credible information sharing.
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Theorem 5 A correlated strategy N-tuple is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium
if and only if it is an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium.
Theorem 5 implies inclusion relations among the diﬀerent notions of strong correlated
equilibria, which are described in Figure 1. 6
Figure 1. Relations Among Diﬀerent Notions of Strong Correlated Equilibria (SCE)
PROOF. The deﬁnitions imply that an all-stage equilibrium is also an ex-ante equi-
librium. We only have to prove the converse. Let f be a correlated strategy N -tuple
that is not an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium. We will show that f is not an
ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium.
Let S ⊆ N ,
(
GS,gS
)
a proﬁtable joint deviation from f , and ω0 ∈ Ω a state, such that it
is common knowledge in ω0 that ∀i ∈ S, E (ui (f) |Gi (ω0)) < E
(
ui
(
gS, f−S
)
|Gi (ω0)
)
.
That is:
Gmeet(ω0) ⊆
{
ω | ∀i ∈ S, E
(
ui (f) |Gi (ω)
)
< E
(
ui
(
gS, f−S
)
|Gi (ω)
)}
(1)
For each deviating player i ∈ S, write Gmeet = Gmeet(ω0) = ⋃˙jGij where the Gij are
disjoint members of Gi, and let ωij ∈ Gij be a state in Gij. We now construct an ex-ante
proﬁtable joint deviation
(
GSea,gSea
)
as follows: ∀i ∈ S, Giea = {Ω}, and
gSea (ω) =

gS(ω) ω ∈ Fmeet
fS(ω) ω /∈ Fmeet
Observe that gSea and f
−S are conditionally independent given fS, thus gSea is well-
deﬁned. We ﬁnish the proof by showing that ∀i ∈ S, E
(
ui
(
gSea, f
−S
))
> E (ui (f)),
which implies that gSea is an ex-ante proﬁtable joint deviation:
E
(
ui
(
gSea, f
−S))− E (ui (f))
=
∫
Ω
(
ui
((
gSea, f
−S) (ω))− ui (f(ω))) dµ
=
∫
Fmeet
(
ui
((
gSea, f
−S) (ω))− ui (f(ω))) dµ (2)
6 Moreno and Wooders (1996, Section 4) and Bloch and Dutta (2009, Example 1) demon-
strate that there are no similar inclusion relations among the diﬀerent notions of coalition-
proof correlated equilibria. The ﬁrst paper also presents an example of an ex-post strong
correlated equilibrium that is not an ex-ante equilibrium.
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=
∫
Fmeet
(
ui
((
gS, f−S
)
(ω)
)
− ui (f(ω))
)
dµ (3)
=
∑
j
∫
F ij
(
ui
((
gS, f−S
)
(ω)
)
− ui (f(ω))
)
dµ (4)
=
∑
j
(
E
(
ui
(
gS, f−S
)
|Gi
(
ωij
))
− E
(
ui (f) |Gi
(
ωij
)))
> 0
Equation (2) holds since gSea = f
S outside Fmeet, (3) holds since gSea = g
S in Fmeet, (4)
follows from Gmeet =
.⋃
jG
i
j, and the inequality is implied by (1). 
4 Example
The next example presents an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium, and a speciﬁc
deviation that is considered by the grand coalition after two players received their
recommended actions. At ﬁrst glance, it seems that all players would unanimously
agree to deviate. However, a more thorough analysis reveals that this is not the case,
and demonstrates the intuition behind Theorem 5: (1) why unanimous agreement to
deviate implies that it is common knowledge that the deviation is proﬁtable; and
(2) why the lack of ex-ante proﬁtable deviations implies that there are no proﬁtable
deviations at later stages.
Table 1 shows the matrix representation of a 3-player game, where player 1 chooses
the row, player 2 chooses the column, and player 3 chooses the matrix.
Table 1
A 3-Player Game With an Ex-Ante Strong Correlated Equilibrium
c1 c2 c3
b1 b2 b3 b1 b2 b3 b1 b2 b3
a1 10,10,10 5, 20,5 0,0,0 5,5,20 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
a2 20,5,5 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
a3 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 7,11,12
Let q be as follows:
(
1
4
(a1, b1, c1) ,
1
4
(a2, b1, c1) ,
1
4
(a1, b2, c1) ,
1
4
(a1, b1, c2)
)
, with an ex-
pected payoﬀ of (10, 10, 10). One can verify that q is the distribution of an ex-ante
strong correlated equilibrium. 7 Consider a stage of a mediation protocol, in which
player 1 received a recommendation to play a1, player 2 received a recommendation to
play b1, and player 3 has not received a recommendation yet. No player knows whether
the other players received their recommended actions. 8 Assume that at this stage, the
players consider a joint deviation g - always playing (a3, b3, c3). At ﬁrst glance, it seems
7 The distribution of a correlated strategy N -tuple f is a function qf that assigns to each
n-tuple of actions a ∈ A the number Pr (f−1 (a)).
8 To simplify presentation, we assume that it is common knowledge that each player has
either received his recommended action or has not received any information.
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that they would unanimously agree to deviate: conditioned on his recommended ac-
tion, player 1 (2) gets a higher payoﬀ if they deviate. Player 3 does not know his
recommended action, and the deviation gives him a higher ex-ante expected payoﬀ.
However, we now show that g is not proﬁtable for player 3. Player 1 can only earn
from g if he received a recommendation to play a1. Thus, if player 1 agrees to deviate,
then the other players deduce that he received a1. The expected payoﬀ of player 2 ,
conditioned on that player 1 received a1, is 11
2
3
. Thus, if player 2 agrees to deviate (and
get only 11), then player 3 deduces that player 2 received b1. Conditional on player 1
receiving a1 and player 2 receiving b1, the deviation is not proﬁtable to player 3.
References
[1] Aumann R., 1959. Acceptable Points in General cooperative n-person Games. In: Kuhn
HW, Luce RD (eds) Contributions to the Theory of Games IV. Princeton University
Press, NJ, 287-324.
[2] Aumann R., 1976. Agreeing to disagree. Ann. Statist. 4 (6), 1236-1239.
[3] Aumann R., 1987. Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality.
Econometrica 55, 1-18.
[4] Bernheim B.D., Peleg B., Whinston M., 1987. Coalition-proof Nash equilibria - I.
concepts. J. Econ. Theory 42, 1-12.
[5] Bloch F., Dutta B., 2009. Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional
deviations. Games Econ. Behav., 721-728.
[6] Einy E., Peleg B., 1995. Coalition-proof communication equilibria. In: Barnett W, Moulin
H, Salles M, Schoﬁeld N (eds), Social Choice, Welfare & Ethics, Cambridge, New-York
and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
[7] Heller Y., forthcoming. Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol. Games Econ. Behav.
[8] Holmstrom B., Myerson RB, 1983. Eﬃcient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete
Information, Econometrica 51, 1799-1819.
[9] Milgrom P., Roberts J., 1996. Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary
communication possibilities. Games Econ. Behav. 17, 113-128.
[10] Moreno D., Wooders J., 1996. Coalition-proof equilibrium. Games Econ. Behav. 17, 80-
113.
[11] Moulin H., Vial J.P., 1978. Strategically zero-sum games: the class of games whose
completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon. Int. J. Game Theory 7, 201-221.
[12] Ray I., 1996. Coalition-proof correlated equilibrium: a deﬁnition. Games Econ. Behav.
17, 56-79.
[13] Ray I., 1998. Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior. Rev. Econ. Design
3, 257-269
7
